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Appellant, Jamis M. Johnson ("Mr. Johnson"), appearing pro se,
respectfully files his Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure ("URAP"). The Summary Judgment below granting an order
to extend the judgment against Appellant should be vacated, as a matter of law,
because there remain to be tried genuine issues of material fact raised by
Appellant Johnson below which issues include Mr. Johnson's challenges to the
validity of the assigned judgment in the hands of the assignee Jayson Orvis,
Plaintiff below and Appellee here, and the validity of the actual assignment itself
of the same judgment to Mr. Orvis.
Dated t h i s ^ T day of May, 2005.
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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court is
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j); and Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3.

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue No. 1:

Did the district court err by ignoring all the issues raised by the
defense but granting Appellee On/is' motion for summary
judgment on the sole ground of the voidability of the
assignments to and from the expired LLC, and where the
defenses duly raised below by Appellant raised genuine and
material factual issues that must be tried, thus, precluding
summary judgment, as a matter of law, and where every one
of the defenses raised is material because the outcome of this
case is affected by a decision on any one of those issues?
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT
64, If 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT
84,H13, 34 P.3d 755).
4

Issue No. 2:

Is it a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment
below that Jayson Orvis was a partner with Appellant and
DaNell Johnson and, in conspiracy with their attorney Victor
Lawrence, violated partner and attorney fiduciary duty to
Appellant by acquiring the Belding Judgment, to extinguish the
partnership, and mask fraud on Appellant, and voiding the
judgment in the hands of Appellee Orvis, as a matter of public
policy and law?
This issue was preserved below. [Record p. 13, fl 13]
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT
64, H 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT
84, If 13, 34P.3d755).

Issue No. 3:

Is it a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment below that Orvis used partnership monies
misappropriated from the Orvis-Johnson partnership to acquire
the Belding judgment and thus the judgment is owned and is
the property of the Orvis-Johnson partnership and not of Orvis
individually, and because the judgment is otherwise expired,
and the right party has not filed a complaint to extend the
judgment, the complaint of Appellee Orvis must be dismissed?
This issue was preserved below: [Record p.11, fl 13]
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT
64, fl 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT
84,1[13, 34P.3d755).

Issue No. 4:

Is it a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment below that the judgment is satisfied and of no further
force and effect because Orvis has withheld at least $1.5
Million in partnership profit share from Johnsons by use of the
judgment and otherwise?
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This issue was preserved below: [Record p. 10, fl 12]
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT
64, H 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT
84,^13, 34 P.3d 755).
Issue No. 5:

Did the district court abuse it discretion in denying Appellant's
Motion To Strike when Orvis filed a pleading and affidavit
wholly irrelevant and unresponsive to any issues in the case;
that was false; and that was filed for, what Orvis and counsel
admitted was for a malicious and immaterial purpose to malign
Appellant and also Appellant's family?
This issue was preserved below: [Record pp. 580-581 and p.
1114, transcript p. 24]
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. The standard of review is whether the judge abused
its discretion in allowing wholly irrelevant, false, outrageously
defamatory, inadmissible, and illegal evidence. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, H 16, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting
State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, fl 18, 993 P.2d 837).

Issue No. 6:

Did the district court err and abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Appellant and
counsel for filing the malicious affidavit and pleading for a
malicious purpose, for hiring an unlicensed private detective
who, among other things, conversed with Appellant's minor
children, in violation of Utah criminal law, and, who, when
receiving notice that their use of the unlicensed detective and
his surveillance of the minor children, and the false affidavit
were in violation of Utah criminal law, and upon receiving
request for assistance to rectify this violation of law and to
comply with the said law, failed and refused to take any steps
or admit violation of law until after a hearing wherein in the
wrongful and malicious affidavit was relied on by counsel and
the court?
This issue was preserved below: [Record pp. 958,1017,
6

1052,1J4 and pp. 1067-1068]
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. The standard of review is whether the judge abused
its discretion First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). Cited with approval in Wright v.
Wrights, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 07/03/1997).
Issue No. 7:

Did the district court abuse it's discretion when, in granting a
protective order in favor of Appellee Orvis below, the court
awarded attorney fees to Orvis as a monetary sanction against
Appellant for too short a notice for setting depositions, when
the actual dates and notices and parties for depositions were
the same as actually and already set by Orvis and then
Appellant in two of the other five cases brought by Orvis
against Appellant and his family, and Orvis had more than ten
days notice of the dates and persons; and there was evidence
presented that there was an urgency to hold such discovery
because parties were going to be unavailable?
This issue was preserved below: [Record p. 1113, transcript
p. 6]
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting
authority. The standard of review is whether the judge abused
its discretion First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). Cited with approval in Wright v.
Wrights, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 07/03/1997).

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Orvis purchased a judgment against Appellant and he filed a complaint
below in an attempt to renew and extend the soon-to-expire judgment. This was
done preparatory to using the judgment offensively against Appellant Johnson to
extinguish Johnson's partnership with Orvis and conceal misappropriated
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partnership funds. Appellant defended against Orvis' acquisition and possession
of the judgment, and Johnson also counterclaimed against Orvis, who is
Johnson's partner, for defrauding Johnson and using embezzled partnership
money to acquire the judgment, in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duty.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE:
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment below. The case
proceeded thusly.
June 6, 2002: Appellee Orvis filed the complaint to renew and extend a
soon-to-expire judgment that he had purchased against Appellant.
July 15, 2002: Appellant answered and counterclaimed. In said answer,
appellant raised numerous affirmative defenses to the complaint of Appellee.
March 26, 2004: Appellee Orvis moved for summary judgment to renew
the judgment.
June 1, 2004: Appellant Johnson filed a Memorandum and an Affidavit
with exhibits in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
June 9, 2004: Orvis filed a Reply and supporting Affidavit of unlicensed
detective, Crawley.
June 22, 2004: Appellant filed a Motion to Strike the reply of Orvis and the
supporting Crawley affidavit.
June 23, 2004: Appellee filed his opposition to the Motion To Strike (which
included the offending statements referenced below, and which are part of the
8

Rule 11 sanctions.)
October 26, 2004: The court granted Orvis' Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied Appellant's Motion To Strike.
November 24, 2004: Appellant filed a Motion for Rule 11 sanctions against
Orvis and counsel.
April 29, 2005: The district court executed the order denying the motion for
sanctions.
V. FACTS
BELDING JUDGMENT ACQUIRED
1. Mr. Orvis purchased a judgment (the "Belding Judgment") against Mr.
Johnson, in August of 2001. [Record p.2 U 9]
2. The Belding judgment was originally entered against Mr. Johnson on
April 5, 1995. [Record p. 2 fl 7]
3. Action on a Utah judgment is barred after eight years. (Utah Code § 7812-22) [Record p. 98 U 4]
4. As of April 5, 2003, any action on the Belding judgment would be barred
by the statute of limitations, unless this action is successfully maintained and the
judgment renewed and extended by Mr. Orvis. [Record p. 98 ^ 5]
COMPLAINT AGAINST MR. JOHNSON
5. Mr. Orvis, on June 1, 2002, filed the Complaint herein (one of five
complaints he has filed against Appellant Johnson) in Third District Court, below,
9

to renew the Belding Judgment before the eight year statute ran out. But for that,
the Belding Judgment is otherwise expired. [Record p. 98 U 6]
6. Mr. Orvis used a dissolved LLC to acquire the Belding Judgment
(discussed infra) which lacked the power under Utah law to accept the
assignment of the Belding judgment and to re-assign it the next day to Mr. Orvis,
and thus Orvis does not validly possess the Belding judgment. [Record p. 98 U 7]
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
7. Mr. Johnson filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint
asserting by way of affirmative defenses and by way of counterclaims that:
[Record p. 9]
a.

Mr. Orvis is in a longstanding and well documented

partnership with Mr. Johnson and/or with DaNell Johnson, Appellant's wife
[Record pp. 12-13];
b.

Mr. Orvis has embezzled money from the partnership and has

used those funds improperly to, among other things, buy this Belding judgment.
Therefore, the Belding judgment is property of the partnership whose money was
used to purchase it, and the judgment is not the property of Mr. Orvis, and so
Orvis cannot maintain this action [Record p. 11 U's13 & 14 pp.15 &16];
c.

Mr. Orvis is part, operator, de facto owner, and alter ego of a

law firm with, a Utah Attorney, Victor Lawrence [Record p.98 U 8c];
d.

Said Utah Attorney was also the attorney for DaNell Johnson
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and also for Mr. Johnson [Record p. 13 fl 12];
e.

Mr. Orvis and said Utah attorney conspired to acquire this

Belding judgment to fraudulently acquire the interest and cash flow of Mr.
Johnson and DaNell Johnson, who are Orvis partners and former Lawrence
clients, and to conceal the embezzlement and fraud of Mr. Orvis and Lawrence;
and as such, the acquisition of the Belding judgment by a Utah attorney and
partner Orvis, are unlawful, a fraud on Mr. Johnson, and is against public policy
[Record p. 11 U's 14 and 17];
f.

Appellant Johnson seeks an accounting for embezzled

partnership funds and for establishing punitive damages [Record p. 14];
g.

There is a complete offset to the Belding judgment because

Orvis has withheld over $1.5 million of profit share owed to the Johnsons; and
h.

The Belding judgment was not validly assigned to Mr.

Orvis. [Record p. 14, f s 18-19]
8. Mr. Orvis moved for summary judgment to renew said Belding judgment
and Mr. Johnson opposed said motion for the reasons set forth herein below that
outline the business relation of the parties and the fraud of Orvis. [Record pp. 2931 and 97-110]
HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP
9. Mr. Orvis, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, and three others founded a partnership
to perform "credit repair". This partnership formed various business entities and
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various partners operated the entities. There is extensive documentary evidence
of this partnership arrangement. [Record p. 98 fl 5 through p. 101 fl 14]
10. Three of the partners departed, for one reason or another, leaving only
Mr. Orvis and the Johnsons by fall of 1997. (The remaining partnership involving
Orvis and Johnsons is referred to herein as the "Orvis-Johnson Partnership".)
Mr. Johnson and DaNell Johnson, wife of Mr. Johnson, held this venture in an
arrangement similar to prior ventures between them. [Record p. 99 fl 11]
11. The Orvis-Johnson partnership continued for several years to divide
monthly profit share. [Record p. 99 fl 12]
12. There is extensive evidence of the Orvis-Johnson partnership including
written agreements, profit share accounting, correspondence, division of
partnership profits, course of performance, deposition testimony in various of the
numerous lawsuits instigated by Orvis against the Johnsons. [Record p. 100 U 13]
13. Appellant Johnson would learn, and depositions of third parties and
discovery would demonstrate, that Orvis was embezzling from the Orvis-Johnson
partnership. This is evidenced by, among other things, the following:
a.

Mr. Orvis was misrepresenting the actual amount of revenue

coming into the Orvis-Johnson partnership. Attached to the Johnson Affidavit
opposing summary judgment [Record page 111 et seq.] in the District Court case
below as Exhibit "6" [Record p. 148] are Excerpts of Deposition of Tommy
Triplett, assistant to Jayson Orvis, See pages 19-20 and 28 thereof [Record pp.
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167-168 and 176]; and Exhibit "7" [Record p. 228] which is Excerpts of Deposition
of Will Vigil, employee of Victor Lawrence, See pages 33, 37-38, and 68.
[Record pp. 261, 265-266 and 296]
b.

Mr. Orvis was setting up secret companies to divert money

away from the Orvis-Johnson partnership. (Attached to said Johnson Affidavit
[Record p. 111 et seq.] below as Exhibit 6 Triplett Depo. Infra, p. 25, 31, and 41
[Record pp. 173, 179 and 189], and Exhibit 7 Vigil Depo. Infra, pp. 63 and 106
[Record pp. 291 and 334])
c.

Orvis was conspiring with others to cut Johnsons out of the

partnership. (Attached to said Johnson Affidavit below [Record p. 111] as Exhibit
8, Deposition of Jade Griffen, See page 34.) [Record p. 407].
14. On August 16, 2001, Appellant Johnson sent to Orvis a demand for an
accounting from Orvis. (See demand for accounting from Johnson to Orvis,
dated August 16, 2001 attached as Exhibit 9 to Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record
p. 417]
15. To avoid an accounting which would have revealed his ongoing
embezzlement, Orvis in August 2001, in conspiracy with attorney Lawrence
surreptitiously acquired judgments (the Belding judgment and an SBA judgment)
against Mr. Johnson and summoned Johnson to the office of attorney Dan
Berman, where Berman announced that Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence had
obtained the judgments against Johnson in order to extinguish the Orvis-Johnson
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partnership. Attorney Berman further told Appellant Johnson that Johnson had
been sued by Orvis that day, August 30, 2001, and should settle or it would cost
the Johnsons $300,000 to fight the lawsuit. (See letter of Appellant Johnson to
Attorney Berman dated August 30, 2001, attached as Exhibit 10 to Johnson
Affidavit below.) That initial case is before Third District Judge Timothy Hanson,
Civil No. 010907449. [Record p. 102 U 16]
SHAM DISSOLVED LLC
16. When Mr. Orvis purchased the Belding judgment, he used as a "front" a
dissolved Utah limited liability company, All Star Financial, LLC, ("All Star, LLC")
whose sole member was Mark Kemp. [Record p. 102 fl 18]
17. All Star, LLC was in an administratively dissolved status with the State
of Utah as of July 3, 2001, approximately 50 days before Mr. Orvis used it to
acquire the Belding Judgment. [Record p. 102 If 19.]
18. On August 10, 2001, while dissolved and lacking capacity, All Star, LLC
allegedly received an assignment of the Belding Judgment. (Exhibit 11,
Assignment of Belding to All Star, LLC dated August 23, 2001 attached to the
Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record p. 102 ^ 20] Said assignment was not for the
purpose of winding up its affairs.
19. Within 24 hours thereafter, All Star, LLC assigned the judgment to Mr.
Orvis. (Exhibit 12, Assignment of All Star, LLC to Orvis dated August 24, 2001
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attached to Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record p. 102 fl 21] Said assignment was
not for the purpose of winding up its affairs.
20. Mr. Orvis used the diverted and embezzled partnership funds from the
Orvis-Johnson partnership to acquire the Belding Judgment through All Star,
LLC. [Record p. 103^22.
ATTORNEY VICTOR LAWRENCE
21. Attorney Victor Lawrence is also involved in this conspiracy to defraud
the Johnsons from their interest in the Orvis-Johnson Partnership. (Triplett Depo.
Infra, p. 45 attached to Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record p. 103 fl 23]
22. Victor Lawrence represented DaNell Johnson in important matters,
including representation of her as a partner to the Orvis-Johnson Partnership
before the SBA (One of the very judgments acquired by Orvis with Lawrence's
help). (Exhibit 13, cover page of Deposition of DaNell Johnson in SBA case,
showing representation by Victor Lawrence attached to Johnson Affidavit below.)
[Record p. 1031J24]
23. Victor Lawrence also represented Jamis Johnson in various matters,
including, at times, in his Utah bar matters and with his obligations to the SBA
and Lexington Law Firm. [Record p. 103^25]
24. Discovery has revealed that attorney Victor Lawrence with Orvis used
information gleaned while representing the Johnsons to take advantage of the
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Johnsons, and he conspired with Appellee Orvis to obtain the SBA and Belding
judgments. (Exhibit 6, Triplett Depo, infra, page 45.) [Record p. 103 U 26]
25. Subsequent information also indicates that Victor Lawrence attempted
in conspiracy with Orvis to look for and obtain any other judgments against his
clients to seize, convert, and extinguish the Orvis-Johnson partnership. [Record
p. 1031J27].
ORVIS TAKING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
26. Orvis and Lawrence work closely together in Lexington Law Firm, with
Orvis making all major decisions, and with Orvis sweeping 70% of profits for
himself from Victor Lawrence's Lexington Law firm, for owning, managing and
marketing. Orvis is in actuality, the owner of the firm; and the firm is his alter ego;
and he controls all aspects of the law firm, though he is a non-lawyer. (Exhibit 7,
Vigil Depo, supra, page 70, and Exhibit 14, Management Agreement between
Orvis and Lawrence, attached to Johnson Affidavit filed in lower court below.)
[Record p. 103 U 28]
27. Mr. Orvis and attorney Lawrence have much to gain from this
conspiracy. This case involves millions of dollars and it is estimated that Jayson
Orvis is today personally taking $500,000 to $800,000 monthly from the credit
repair ventures, at least one third of which belongs to the Johnsons. (Ex. 7, Vigil
Deposition p. 70, line 6-15) (Lexington web page: lexingtonlaw.com) (Ex. 6,
Deposition of Tommy Triplett p. 22,1. 14, where Orvis takes in $153,000 in one
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month several years ago.) and Lexington Law Firms has 75,000 to 150,000
clients each paying $35 monthly and Orvis takes the lion's portion of this money.
(Ex. 7, Vigil Deposition supra.), and Victor Lawrence is making, it is estimated,
more than $60,000 per month and his income jumped radically as soon as the
lawsuit was filed by Berman, and the profit share cut off and seized from the
Johnsons and split by attorney Lawrence and Mr. Orvis. [Record p. 103 fl 29.
ALL STAR, LLC ACTIVE DESPITE "DISSOLVED" STATUS
28. Within the last three months, it has emerged that All Star, LLC, the
dissolved Utah LLC is still being actively and fraudulently used despite its
dissolution and complete expiration. In a case filed in California, home owners
complain of facts revealing a fraudulent activity by the dissolved LLC and it is
named as a defendant along with Mark Kemp, its principal. [Record pp. 819 ^ 1]
A search of judgments in Utah Courts against All Star, LLC reveals that All Star,
LLC is actively and fraudulently being used continuously though dissolved and
expired.
FACTS RELATED TO MOTION TO STRIKE:
29. Mr. Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment to renew the Belding
Judgment. [Record p. 29]
30. Mr. Johnson answered with a memorandum in opposition. [Record
p.97]
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31. In Reply, Mr. Orvis filed a reply brief [Record p. 459] and an affidavit by
a William Crawley ("Crawley Affidavit) [Record p. 466] that were wholly irrelevant
and unresponsive, and were instead a personal attack on Appellant Johnson and
his family with no apparent relationship to the pending motion for summary
judgment. (Indeed, Mr. Orvis failed to rebut or respond to any of the issues of law
or material issues of fact raised by Mr. Johnson, presumably leaving those
matters resolved in Mr. Johnson's favor.)
The following are examples of the irrelevance and scandalous nature of the
reply and the Crawley Affidavit. The Johnsons' minor children, for example, were
the subject of the Crawley Affidavit and Crawley declared that he had secretly
conversed with the children soliciting information from them and using their
unwitting testimony in the affidavit. The Crawley Affidavit states "I [Crawley] had
numerous telephone and in-person conversations with the children of Mr.
Johnson." [Crawley Affidavit-Record p. 4691f 11.] Photographs of the Johnson
residence, for example, were included in the Crawley Affidavit and the tax
valuation. [Record p. 488.] Crawley declared that Mr. Johnson had been a
defendant in 93 cases. [Record p 867 fl 4] attaching a printout. This information
was false and misleading and inflammatory for a host of reasons—Johnson was
actually a party plaintiff in many cited cases, some of the cited cases did not
exist, or did not involve Appellant; some cases were duplicated many times,
some cases duplicated a lapsed tax lien 15-20 times, some cases were suits
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involving Johnson as a trustee in real property foreclosures and not him
personally, etc. In short, the information was very misleading but highly
inflammatory and had no relevance to the pending motion for summary judgment
or the issues raised regarding the Belding judgment. The Crawley Affidavit was
blatantly immaterial and irrelevant and simply mean spirited.
Further, Mr. Orvis had hired an unlicensed private investigator, William
Crawley, (in violation of Utah law—UCA 53-9-101 et. seq.) to perform the
investigation and surveillance of Mr. Johnson, the minor children, the residence,
and to prepare and submit under oath the irrelevant and illegally gathered
information.
32. Appellant Johnson moved to strike this scandalous and irrelevant reply
and illegal Crawley affidavit based on three grounds: i) it was not for the purpose
to rebut as required by Utah law [Record p. 586]; and it was improper under Rule
56(e) and 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Record pp. 587, 588.]
33. In response to Johnson's Motion to Strike, in the face of the accusation
of irrelevance and malice raised by Mr. Johnson, Orvis bluntly admitted that the
malicious reply and affidavit were for no reason other than to accuse Mr. Johnson
and his family of fraud and for no relevant or responsive purpose related to the
pending motion for summary judgment. [Record p. 593]
34. Though Mr. Johnson's Motion to Strike was extensively briefed and
supported by case law and the Rules, the trial Court denied the Motion to Strike
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with virtually no opportunity by Appellant to argue it. [Record p. 1114, transcript
p. 34 L10]
35. At the hearing, the Trial Court did observe that the Crawley Affidavit
was irrelevant, saying that"... I struggled with why it [the Crawley Affidavit] was
submitted" [Record p. 1081 and Transcript of summary judgment argument p. 34
line 4 et. seq.) and that if the affidavit were submitted for some "equitable"
purpose that such was not a factor in this matter. [Record p. 1081, Transcript
p.34,line6.]
MR. ORVIS AND HIS COUNSEL TOMSIC REFUSE
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL FALSE AFFIDAVIT
36. The private investigator engaged by Orvis and counsel Tomsic was not
licensed, a violation of Utah criminal law. UCA 53-9-101 et seq. [Record p.
1067]
37. The private investigator surveilled Mr. Johnson and his home and
family and spoke covertly with Mr. Johnson's minor children. [Record p. 587]
38. The unlicensed private investigator provided the illegally obtained
affidavit in court with Appellee's malicious and irrelevant reply and containing
false statements. [Record p. 586]
39. On October 4, 2004, Mr. Johnson wrote Orvis' counsel Tomsic, giving
Orvis and counsel Tomsic notice that the private investigator was unlicensed, that
it was also a violation by counsel to hire the investigator, and asking counsel's
help in rectifying this situation. [Record p. 1062]
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40. Orvis and counsel Tomsic refused to respond and took no action and
refused to correct the unlawful act or to correct or retract the unlawful and false
affidavit or to rectify the violation of the law despite request and notice. [Record
p.1067]
41. At the argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to
Strike, Orvis and counsel Tomsic argued from and allowed the district court to
rely on these illegally obtained pleadings although by then Mr. Orvis and counsel
had received direct notice and request to withdraw said pleadings and inform the
court. Mr. Orvis and counsel continued to refuse to rectify or correct the illegality
but continued to rely on them. [Record p. 1067]
42. Now, Counsel Tomsic has admitted by affidavit, in response to a
motion for Rule 11 sanctions that the private investigator was in violation of the
law, but has failed to take any action to correct or rectify this violation or explain
their inaction or why Orvis and Counsel did not inform the court. [Record p. 1052]
43. At the hearing on the Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions, Appellant
countered with a Motion For Contempt because, as yet, Appellant had not been
able to pay the attorneys fees awarded earlier by the district court for Appellee's
earlier motion for a protective order (discussed below).
44. The Court denied the Rule 11 sanctions motion.
FACTS RELATING TO PROTECTIVE ORDER AND SANCTIONS
45. Orvis has sued Johnson in five courts—three state and two federal:
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Third District court cases: Judge T. Hanson, civ.no. 010907449; Judge T.
Medley, civ. no. 020904919; Judge S. McCleve, civ. no. 050905242; Federal
Court: Judge Bruce Jenkins, 2:95-CV-838J; Judge Teena Campbell, civ. no.
1:04CV00087TC.
46. Mr. Orvis, and then also, Mr. Johnson sought discovery of several
witnesses, Paul Schwenke, Mark Cummings and Bruce Giffen. [Record p. 635]
47. Mr. Johnson had learned that Victor Lawrence was departing
imminently for Greece outside of the reach of this case; and further Mr. Johnson
had learned that Lawrence's colleague, A. Paul Schwenke, who is a witness to
Lawrence's and Orvis' fraud against Johnsons, was facing criminal charges
(possibly involving Lawrence also) and that his trial was originally scheduled for a
date earlier than scheduled discovery and that Schwenke may also be difficult to
depose if he were convicted. [Record p. 636]
48. Further, Mr. Orvis had himself and his counsel previously noticed up
the depositions of Cummings, and Giffen, for early October 2004 in their federal
case. [Record p. 1113, transcript p. 5 L. 5-15]
49. Mr. Orvis then rescheduled the planned deposition dates to postpone
them beyond the original deposition dates and beyond the alleged departure date
of Lawrence and beyond the scheduled trial date for Schwenke. [Record p. 1113,
transcript p. 9 L. 2-7]

22

50. Mr. Johnson noticed up for the two federal cases the depositions of
Schwenke, and Cummings, and Giffen (and was trying to serve Lawrence) for the
dates that Mr. Orvis had originally set in early October. [Record 1113, transcript
p. 6, L 13-18}
51. Because Mr. Johnson had noticed up the depositions of these
individuals in the other two federal cases (before Judge Jenkins and Judge
Campbell) Mr. Johnson, a few days before said deposition dates filed similar
notices of depositions in this case as well, also set for the proposed dates in
federal court. [Record 1113, transcript p. 6 L 13-18]
52. Mr. Orvis moved for a protective Order here based on too short a
notice. [Record p. 756]
53. The District Court granted Mr. Orvis' motion, and, because of the short
notice in this case, the court imposed monetary sanctions of attorney's fees
against Appellant. [Record p. 810]
54. Though the notices of deposition in this case were short, they actually
were the same dates in notices given to Mr. Orvis approximately 10 days earlier
in the two other federal cases. The parties were the same, and the dates were
the same. And there was concern that witnesses were fleeing. [Record p. 1113,
transcript p. 6 L 13-18, p. 9 L. 1-7]
55. Appellant explained to the District Court, that there was a need for a
speedy setting because of the concerns about lost testimony, and also that the
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dates set in this case, were actually the same dates as set much earlier in the
federal cases. [Record p. 1113, transcript p. 6 L. 13-18, p. 9 L. 1-7]

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. Introduction.
The district court granted Appellee Orvis' motion for summary judgment to
extend and renew the Belding judgment that he had purchased. In granting
summary judgment, the district court ruled on only one issue, the voidability of the
assignment of the judgment by a dissolved LLC, (Orvis had acquired the
judgment by using a dissolved LLC as a straw man and Appellant had argued
that it lacked capacity.) In granting summary judgment on this single issue, the
district court had to ignore numerous genuine material issues of fact, any of which
would defeat Orvis' complaint. These issues were duly raised extensively, and
were well documented. The district court erred in ignoring these issues.
B. Genuine issues of material facts exist precluding summary judgment as a
matter of law.
There are several genuine issues of material fact, and the standard for
granting summary judgment are well established, and the facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to Appellant. This the district court did not do. Those
genuine issues of material fact are:
(1). Genuine issue of material fact #1: The Belding judgment in the hands
of Mr. Orvis is void or unenforceable as an instrumentality to accomplish an evil
conspiracy by Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence for substantial gains by
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extinguishing Johnson's partnership interest in the credit repair business between
Mr. Orvis and the Johnsons and to mask and facilitate ongoing fraud. The
conspiracy was also a breach of Mr. Orvis' partnershipfiduciaryduty to Mr.
Johnson and Mr. Lawrence's attorney client fiduciary duty to the Johnsons.
Orvis and Appellant and his wife, are partners in a highly profitable credit
repair business. The partnership is extensively documented and has a course of
performance of many years. The Johnsons' profit share was $34,000 per month
just prior to the purchase of this judgment. Orvis was misappropriating and missaccounting profit share to the Johnsons. Utah attorney, Victor Lawrence, was the
attorney for the Johnsons in the partnership and the SBA judgment and had
inside knowledge, and also was attorney for Orvis and the partnership. Orvis and
Lawrence conspired to acquire the judgment and take the Johnsons' profit share,
and extinguish their partnership and split the profits. Orvis purchased the Belding
judgment to aid in that purpose and hide his fraud. These acts by Orvis and
Lawrence violate partner and attorney fiduciary duty to the Johnsons and are
fraudulent. The acquisition and enforcement of the judgment is a violation of
public policy, is fraudulent, and equity won't support it and the judgment is void in
the hands of Orvis.
(2). Genuine issue of material fact #2: The judgment is invalid in the hands
of Mr. Orvis because it is property of the partnership purchased with partnership
assets.
Orvis purchased the Belding judgment with funds misappropriated from the
Orvis-Johnson partnership. Thus, Orvis would not own the Belding judgment.
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The Orvis-Johnson partnership, whose money was misappropriated and used to
buy the judgment would be the actual owner of this judgment. And thus Orvis is
the wrong party in interest to have brought this lawsuit. His complaint must be
dismissed. And the partnership could not now bring a new complaint because
the judgment is otherwise expired.
(3). Genuine issue of material fact #3: The judgment should be satisfied by
offset against the million plus dollars of profit share unlawfully withheld by Mr.
Orvis from the Johnsons.
At the time that Orvis purchased the judgment, he commenced withholding
the profit share he divided with the Johnsons. The amount of profit share the
Johnsons had been receiving for many months was approximately $34,000 per
month. The total amount withheld by Orvis to date exceeds $1.5 Million (and is
likely much higher because of the misappropriation) That amount is an offset to
the Belding judgment and completely satisfies the Belding judgment.
C. The district court erred in finding the expired status of the limited liability
company at the time it was the grantee of the judgment created only a voidable
transaction rather than a void one.
Orvis used the straw man All Star, LLC to conceal his identity when he first
acquired the Belding judgment. It was at the time administratively dissolved
under Utah law and lacked the capacity to conduct any business but could only
engage in activity to wind up its affairs. Thus it had no capacity to receive the
assignment of the Belding judgment or to re-assign it 24 hours later to Orvis. For
two years, Orvis could have cured the dissolved status by renewing the LLC with
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the State but he failed to do so. The LLC cannot now be reinstated. Orvis, and
the district court in granting summary judgment, relied on the Miller case (supra)
for the proposition that a contract entered into by a dissolved LLC is voidable and
not void. Miller says rather that a dissolved corporation, as the enforcing party of
a contract, entered into while dissolved, cannot enforce the contract. It is void as
to it. But there is an option for the deceived party to void or not. Further, Orvis
approaches this with unclean hands since his purpose in acquiring the judgment
was fraudulent. And even if he successfully acquired the judgment, Appellant's
defenses are still in force.
D. The district court erred in failing to grant Appellant's Motion To Strike the
Crawley Affidavit and the offending portions of the Reply Memorandum of
Appellee which were wholly irrelevant and were filed to malign, and to intimidate
Appellant and his family, and filed with actual malice as stated; and the District
Court erred in failing to award to Appellant Rule 11 Sanctions for filing the
irrelevant and malicious Crawley Affidavit, and for using an unlicensed private
investigator, in violation of Utah law, to obtain the affidavit; and for failing to alert
the court of the fact and failing and refusing to take any steps to rectify said
problems once notice was provided.
Orvis filed the Crawley Affidavit and related Reply. It was not responsive.
It was malicious and maligned. Appellant moved to strike. In response to the
strike motion, Orvis actually stated that the offending affidavit and reply were
submitted for an irrelevant and a malicious purpose. Judge Medley denied the
motion to strike.
Appellant gave written notice to Orvis and counsel Tomsic that they had
engaged an unlicensed private detective in violation of Utah law, and that he had
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spoken covertly with the minor children of Appellant. Appellant requested that
they withdraw the motion and rectify this matter. Orvis refused and argued from
the offending pleadings and later admitted fault. Appellant filed a Rule 11
sanctions motion against Orvis and counsel Tomsic, citing this and the malicious
and irrelevant pleadings and cited other violations in the other four cases filed by
Orvis against Appellant. The district court abused its discretion when it denied
Appellant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
E. The District Court erred in awarding Appellee Orvis monetary sanctions
when granting the protective order.
The district court granted Orvis' motion for protective order as to
Appellant's short notice of depositions of three witnesses. The district court
awarded Orvis attorney's fees against Appellant. Appellant however had not
surprised or inconvenienced Orvis because the dates set were actually the same
dates set ten days earlier in two of the other cases (of the five) filed by Orvis
against Appellant. These dates were originally chosen by Orvis. And Johnson
feared the loss of witnesses and testimony unless he moved fast. Note that the
district court granted these sanctions against Appellant with not even oral
argument though Appellant was arguably acting properly, and yet the district
court refused to strike a scandalous and irrelevant motion by Orvis and refused
Rule 11 sanctions for Orvis' and counsel's willful breaking of the law. There is a
disparity in fairness here.
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VII. ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction

Appellee, Jayson Orvis, (plaintiff below), purchased the Belding Judgment,
(one of two judgments arising from a failed business venture in the late 80's and
early 90's against Appellant Johnson and purchased by Orvis against Appellant)
to use in a conspiracy to extinguish Appellant's interest in the parties' credit repair
business and to conceal misappropriation of profit share by Mr. Orvis. The
Belding judgment was old and ready to expire, so Mr. Orvis brought the complaint
below against Appellant to renew and extend the judgment before it expired.
Appellant Johnson in answering the Orvis complaint mounted several defenses to
the Orvis complaint including the following: (1) Mr. Orvis could not seek an
extension of the judgment because the judgment is void in the hands of Mr. Orvis
because the judgment was the subject matter of fraud, conspiracy to defraud,
breach of fiduciary duties by Johnson's lawyer, Victor Lawrence, and Johnson's
partner, Jayson Orvis; (2) The assignment of the judgment was defective
because the straw man assignee, a defunct limited liability company called All
Star Financial, LLC, ("All Star, LLC") put up by Mr. Orvis to initially receive the
assignment, was an expired limited liability company without legal capacity to
receive the assignment, or the legal capacity to, one day later, re-assign it to
Orvis; (3) The judgment was not owned by Orvis but was, in actuality, the
property of the Johnson-Orvis partnership because Mr. Orvis used partnership
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funds, misappropriated from the partnership, to purchase it; and (4) the judgment
had been fully satisfied because Appellee Orvis had withheld at least $1.5 Million
of Appellant's profit share from the Johnson-Orvis partnership since wrongly
acquiring the judgment.
Mr. Orvis' reply to Appellant Johnson's Memorandum and Affidavit
opposing summary judgment entirely failed to respond to or rebut any of the
issues of law raised by Appellant, except one—the voidability of the assignment
issue.
The court below erred by ignoring all the issues raised by the defense and
granted Appellee Orvis' motion for summary judgment [Record p. 807] on the
sole ground that the assignments to and from the expired LLC were valid
because the status of the assignee, All Star, LLC, as a dissolved limited liability
company without capacity, only made the assignment voidable and not void. The
issue for the validity of the assignment is discussed under Section III below. The
defenses as set forth above raised genuine and material factual issues that must
be tried, thus, precluding summary judgment, as a matter of law. Indeed, every
one of the defenses raised is material because the outcome of this case is
affected by a decision on any one of those issues. Beginning with defense #1
above, if Appellant Johnson were to prove at the trial of this case that Appellee
Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence indeed conspired to defraud him by
purchasing the Belding judgment and Mr. Orivs and Mr. Lawrence actually
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defrauded Appellant Johnson, and they did so in breach of their fiduciary duties
(as lawyer and partner, respectively), the court of equity will certainly vitiate,
rather than enforce, the judgment as fruit of the poisonous tree. Similarly, the
outcome is different if at the trial Appellant Johnson was able to establish the
Appellee Orvis used partnership funds to purchase the judgment. If Mr. Johnson
does so prove the above, the judgment legally belongs to the partnership and not
to Appellee Orvis. If the judgment is partnership property, then it is the
partnership and not Mr. Orvis that should be bringing this case—and because the
judgment is otherwise expired, it would be too late for an entirely different entity to
file this complaint to extend this judgment. Moreover, apart from establishing that
the judgment is partnership property, Appellant can well establish that Mr. Orvis
has unlawfully withheld over $1.5 million in profit share, which would be more
than sufficient to completely offset the payment of the judgment. Since any one
of the three defenses above would affect the outcome of this case, and each
issue raises genuine and material factual issues, summary judgment should have
been denied. Therefore, the summary judgment must be reversed and this
matter remanded to the district court for a trial of the excluded genuine issues of
material fact.
B.

Genuine issues of material facts exist precluding
summary judgment as a matter of law

It is axiomatic that "[sjummary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment
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as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 235 (Utah 1993). (Emphasis added). Because summary judgment is a
question of law, this court accords no deference to the district court's grant of
summary judgment. See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996).
Furthermore, "in reviewing a grant of summary judgment,.. .the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [must be viewed] in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Under this
standard, the district court erred in granting summary judgment while genuine
issues of material facts were raised by Appellant Johnson, the non-moving party.
(1). Genuine issue of material fact #1: The Belding
judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis is void or
unenforceable as an instrumentality to accomplish an
evil conspiracy by Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor
Lawrence for substantial gains by extinguishing
Johnson's partnership interest in the credit repair
business between Mr. Orvis and the Johnsons and to
mask and facilitate ongoing fraud. The conspiracy was
also a breach of Mr. Orvis' partnership fiduciary duty to
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Lawrence's attorney client fiduciary
duty to the Johnsons.
The Answer and Counterclaim [Record pp.9-18] sets forth this issue with
particularity. In the Answer, Mr. Johnson alleged as an Eighth Defense [Record
p. 11] that "[t]he acquisition of the judgments [including the Belding judgment] by
Plaintiff is for the purpose of masking fraud and the violation of fiduciary duty and
involves a law firm and a defense against said law firm, and such acquisition of
the judgment and its use thereby is a violation of public policy." (Emphasis
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added.) Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208,1999 UT
49, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1999). The supporting facts of the existence of
the credit repair partnership and partner fiduciary duties between Mr. Orvis and
the Johnsons were alleged with clarity in paragraphs 2 through 5 [Record, p. 12)
and paragraphs 6 through 9 (Record p. 13] and throughout subsequent pleadings
and oral arguments. The supporting facts as to attorney Mr. Victor Lawrence's
role as attorney, owing fiduciary duties to the partnership and the Johnsons were
set forth with clarity in paragraphs 12 (Record p.13) and throughout subsequent
pleadings and oral arguments. Attorney Lawrence represented Mrs. DaNell
Johnson (among other matters) at the SBA post judgment proceedings where
she elaborated on her partnership with Mr. Orvis. Attorney Lawrence learned
during his representation that the SBA would take pennies on the dollar to settle
the judgment against Mr. Johnson. Instead of aiding his client, attorney
Lawrence conspired with Orvis to purchase the judgment and use it with the
Belding judgment to attempt to extinguish Johnsons' interest in the highly
profitable credit repair business. Paragraph 13 and 16 [Record p. 13 and 14].
As their attorney, Victor Lawrence owed the Johnsons a fiduciary duty of
complete loyalty and that duty means that he "must never use [his] position of
trust to take advantage of his client's confidences for [himself] or for other
parties." Walter v. Wiley, Rein& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) ["In all relationships with clients, attorneys are required to exercise
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impeccable honesty, fair dealing and fidelity." (emphasis added)] The court of
appeal in Walter v. Stewart also emphasized the Kilpatrick ruling and held that
"[attorneys are 'not permitted to take advantage of [theirl position or superior
knowledge to impose upon [clients]; nor to conceal facts or law, nor in any way
deceive fclientsl without being held responsible therefor.' (Emphasis added.)
Civil conspiracy is a recognized cause of action in Utah. Tanner v. Carter,
20 P.3d 332, 2001 UT 18 (Utah 02/23/2001). Here an attorney and a partner
conspired against their clients for substantial gain at their expense, and to hide
preceding and ongoing fraud against them, and to extinguish and convert the
Johnsons' partnership interest. At the time of the conspiracy, the Johnsons were
receiving $34,000.00 per month in profit share. Their attorney and their partner
conspired to purchase judgments against Mr. Johnson and use the threat of the
execution and other force of law to i) compel the Johnsons to walk away from
$34,000.00 a month (and increasing) in profit share, ii) to divide that profit share
between themselves, (Orvis and Lawrence) and iii) to hide and offensively stop
an audit and accounting that would reveal prior and on-going fraud in accounting
for and allocation of profit share. As soon as the judgments were purchased,
attorney Dan Berman, who represents both Victor Lawrence and Jayson Orvis,
summoned Mr. Johnson over to his office where Mr. Johnson was informed that
Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence had acquired the judgments; that Mr. Johnson must
abandon his partnership; that suit had been filed against Johnson; and that it
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would cost Mr. Johnson some $300,000 to defend himself and settlement would
be advisable.
The facts of the conspiracy, the breach of lawyer and partner fiduciary
duties and fraud have been articulated with particularity and the district court was
duty bound to present the issues to a trier of fact. The district court's failure to do
so is reversible error that can only be corrected for this court to reverse the
summary judgment and remand this case for trial.

(2). Genuine issue of material fact #2: The judgment
is invalid in the hands of Mr. Orvis because it is property
of the partnership purchased with partnership assets.
This issue was raised in the Answer and Counterclaim fl 21 [Record p. 15],
the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the
affidavit in support of the opposition memorandum and in oral argument and
subsequent pleadings. A finding by a trier of fact that indeed Mr. Orvis used
partnership funds to purchase the judgments and that the judgments legally
belong to and are assets of the partnership would clearly vitiate Mr. Orvis' claim
of ownership and entitlement to seek an extension of the judgment. If the
judgment is partnership property, all the partners have to agree to seek extension
and since Mr. Johnson would not have given his consent, the action to seek an
extension of the judgment would not have been properly or timely brought.
Moreover, time to file such an action by the true owner, the partnership, has run
and the partnership is forever barred from instituting such an action.
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(3). Genuine issue of material fact #3: The
judgment should be satisfied by offset against the million
plus dollars of profit share unlawfully withheld bv Mr.
Orvis from the Johnsons.
Mr. Orvis in all the law suits he has instituted against the Johnsons, (five so
far), has never denied that the credit repair business was paying up to $34,000 a
month profit share to the Johnsons, and the amount of profit share has been on
the increase. (Indeed, the amount misappropriated is more likely in the range of
$5 Million.) Mr. Orvis cannot deny that as soon as he purchased the judgments
against Mr. Johnson in August, 2001, Mr. Orvis unlawfully ceased making the
monthly profit share payments of $34,000 to the Johnsons. Simple mathematics
confirm that Mr. Orvis has unlawfully withheld at a minimum over $1.5 million of
Johnsons' profit share. If Mr. Orvis is allowed to offset the Belding judgment
against the Johnson's unlawfully withheld profit share that is more than sufficient
funds to completely satisfy the judgment.

C.

The district court erred in finding the expired status of the
limited liability company at the time it was the grantee of
the judgment created only a voidable transaction rather
than a void one.

On July 3, 2001, All Star Financial LLC, ("All Star, LLC") was
administratively dissolved by the State of Utah, Department of Commerce. Some
50 days later, while All Star, LLC was in its dissolved status, Orvis uses All Star
Financial, LLC, as a front organization to acquire the Belding judgment, (and also
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the SBA judgment) and thus Belding, on August 23, 2001 assigned the judgment
to the dissolved All Star, LLC. The next day, on August 24, 2001, All Star, LLC
turned around and assigned the judgment to Orvis.
These two assignments of judgment are problematic because All Star, LLC
lacked the capacity and power to effect these transactions because it was
dissolved. The assignments to All Star, LLC and from All Star, LLC are void.
Indeed, within two years of its dissolution, this problem might possibly have
been cured by Orvis but no one has ever taken any action to reinstate All Star
Financial, LLC. Utah Code 48-2c-1208 states:
Reinstatement following administrative dissolution.
(1) A company dissolved under Section 48-2c-1207 may apply to the
division for reinstatement within two years after the effective date of
dissolution... [Emphasis added.]
The two year reinstatement period has run out.
An LLC that is dissolved has limited powers while in a dissolved status.
UCA 48-2c-1203. Effect of dissolution.
(1) A dissolved company continues its existence but may not carry on
any business or activities except as appropriate to wind up and liquidate its
business and affairs. [Emphasis added.]
Further, a dissolved LLC has strictly limited powers which, may only be used for
winding up.
UCA 48-2c-1302. Powers of company in winding up.
A dissolved company in winding up has all powers of a company that
is not dissolved but those powers may be used only for the purpose of
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winding up and not for the carrying on of any business or activity other
than that necessary for winding up. [Emphasis added.]
So here is what is left.
All Star, LLC was dissolved. As a dissolved LLC, it did not have power to act
unless action was strictly for winding up. Buying and selling a judgment for Orvis
was not winding up. If that activity was not winding up, All Star, LLC did not have
the ability to either buy or assign the judgment to Orvis. Perhaps All Star, LLC
could have reinstated and Orvis could have tried to cure the dissolved status. It
had two years to do that. No one has ever taken that step. Two years have
passed. When Orvis learned of his mistake, he had the SBA try to cure this
problem by conveying the SBA judgment directly to him since All Star, LLC was
dead. But here, no only is All Star, LLC dead, the Belding judgment is otherwise
expired so Orvis cannot go directly to Belding to have that judgment reconveyed
to him directly.
In this case, Orvis claims to want to renew and extend the Belding
judgment. It would appear that All Star, LLC's purchase of the judgment is void
(as it did not have the authority or capacity to make the purchase) and its
assignment to Orvis is void as All Star, LLC did not have the authority or capacity
to assign the judgment, either. If Orvis does not validly possess the judgment,
then Orvis cannot sue to renew a judgment he does not own, and this case must
be dismissed.
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Appellee Orvis argued that the two assignments of judgment were
"voidable" and not automatically void. Appellee cites Miller v. Celebration Mining
Co. 29 P. 3d 1231 (Utah 2001) for this proposition. The district court relied on
that case. There are problems with this argument. First, the Miller case does not
stand for the proposition for which it is cited by Appellee Orvis. In Miller the
Celebration group had contracted with a dissolved corporation and indeed Miller
may be cited for the proposition that corporations, once lapsed, lack capacity to
contract or enforce contracts. And this holding of Miller actually supports
Appellant Johnson's position, not Appellee's. Thus by analogy to Miller, the
enforcing party, Orvis (alter ego with All Star, LLC) in this instance, is like the
enforcing party in Miller—an individual and former president trying to enforce a
contract entered into by his dissolved corporation. The enforcer lost and could
not enforce because his corporation was dissolved—like Orvis, the enforcing
party here. And the party disputing the enforcement of the contract, Appellant
here, is in that stance of the Celebration Mining group who did not want to have
the contract enforced, and were allowed in the Miller case to repudiate and void
the contract. The one clear point of the Miller decision is that the impaired,
dissolved corporation or individual associated with it does not have any ability to
enforce a contract.
Further for this proposition that lapsed LLC's haven't contracting power,
see cases White v. Dvorak 896 P.2d 85 Wash.App. Div. 1,1995 and Brendv.
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Dome Development, Ltd. 418 N.W.2d 610 N.D.,1988. The prevailing position is
that dissolved and impaired business entities lack capacity to contract. This is
hornbook law. See 19 Am Jur 2d, New Contracts and Transactions § 2891 "In
the absence of any statute continuing its existence, a corporation after its
dissolution or of the expiration or forfeiture of its charter cannot enter into new
contracts or further transact business."
In Murphy v. Crosland 886 P2d 74 (Utah App1994) the Supreme Court
examined extensively the meaning of Utah statutes relating to suspension and
dissolution and expiration. The Court states that there are four periods in the life
of a business entity: pre-incorporation, incorporation, dissolution and expiration.
The Court notes that the legislature must have intended some change in legal
rights when an LLC goes into dissolved status and then after two years ceases
existence. These statutory changes in an LLC's life would have no meaning if an
LLC or its alter egos and would be manipulators could continue business as
though nothing has occurred. During 2 years of dissolution it lacked capacity but
that could have been cured. After two years the entity may not be brought back
from inactivity to full function. It has ceased to exist. And it may not simply
declare its contracts entered into when it lacked capacity, to be fully enforceable
while it has continued its descent into non-existence. Appellee Orvis would use
All Star, LLC to contract and as the filter through which he runs the judgment and
then Orvis would continue to aggressively pursue the judgment demanding his
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pound of flesh as though All Star, LLC were in full good standing, without any
consequence from indifference to state law, or to its lack of good standing and
even its non-existence under state law.
Second, even assuming that a contract (the "assignment") of a dissolved
LLC may be kept from being voided, there must be the assent of the parties to
the continued viability of the assignments. Miller indicates that the Celebration
group (the parties in Miller not affiliated with the dissolved corporation, who
successfully resisted enforcement) had an "option" to decide what to do—
acquiesce to enforcement or declare the contract void. Thus, Miller may be seen
to say that the parties to these types of contracts must assent to the contract's
continued enforcement. The first question is who are the parties to the void
assignments that must be heard from to assure the court that the assignment
should continue in existence? In the first assignment, from PJ's Trucking to AllStar, LLC, the parties to this assignment are PJ's Trucking and All Star, LLC.
Nowhere is there evidence below, presented by Appellee Orvis, that these two,
PJ's and All Star, LLC, have had any actual assent with regard to the nonvoidability of this assignment from PJ's to All Star, LLC. The second assignment
that must be ratified is from All Star, LLC to Orvis. Herein lies a sub-question. Is
not the assignment that must be ratified actually between All Star, LLC and the
Orvis-Johnson partnership—the actual owner of the assignment if
misappropriated partnership funds were used. While Orvis' assent to the ultra
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vires assignment may be inferred, (but under Miller is irrelevant) there is no
evidence that there is assent to the non-voidability of the assignment by All Star,
LLC, other than Appellee Orvis' assumption that this is the case. Certainly there
is no assent to this by the Orvis-Johnson partnership. At a minimum, the district
court must have had evidence of these assents to non-voidability before granting
summary judgment. If the assignments are voidable, not void, depending on the
agreement of the parties to the two assignments, then summary judgment was
still improper without evidence of the actual assent and agreement of the various
parties to the continued validity of the various assignments of the Belding
judgment.
There are further considerations here which are equitable defenses that
would have prevented summary judgment. Reviving a void assignment from the
corpse of a dissolved LLC is an equitable remedy, not one sounding in law. The
law, UCA 48-2C-1203 and 1208 clearly states that All Star, LLC hasn't the
capacity to deal in these assignments. Equity, however, allows the assignments
to escape the harsh thrust of the law voiding them, if the parties thereto agree
that assignments be kept in force. To keep the assignments alive, equity must
step in. There is unequivocal evidence below that these assignment
machinations were crafted by Orvis to defraud and oppress and as part of a
conspiracy—in short evidence of unclean hands— which is a defense to an
equitable remedy. Consider even Orvis' scheme of using the ruse of a straw man
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LLC rather than negotiate outright with Belding and/or the SBA, and all the while
intending within 24 hours to flip the judgment to himself, the real party in interest.
Further, there is evidence of laches here—another equitable defense. Appellee
Orvis engaged his alter ego LLC when it had already been dissolved for 1 V2
months. And then for two years, even when aggressively pursuing this lawsuit,
neither Orvis nor All Star, LLC, took the simple steps of renewing this LLC,
ultimately allowing it to completely expire. Appellee is guilty of laches. Note also,
there is evidence in the record below [Record p 818-886] learned after the grant
of summary judgment, that All Star, LLC and its principals continue to ignore Utah
law, doing transactions though entirely expired and have defrauded a California
homeowner; and also have defrauded the federal government (SBA) with the
same ruse where Orvis put up the expired LLC to acquire an SBA judgment and
within 24 hours flipped it to himself. That situation with the SBA is even more
pernicious because Orvis and attorney Lawrence actually had prior dealings with
the SBA for Jamis Johnson and DaNell Johnson and obviously wanted to conceal
their identity from the SBA. These events recorded without opposition, in the
Record below, also militate against allowing Orvis and All Star, LLC to simply
assert that they desire to keep in force an assignment that is arguably fraudulent.
For the above reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's finding that
the two assignments of the Belding judgment are in force because they are
merely voidable not void.
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Obviously, if the assignments are not void, Orvis must still have to hold
them in trust for the Orvis-Johnson partnership; the judgment may have been
satisfied by offset, the judgment may be a fraud on the Johnsons, but
nonetheless the assignments should be void.

D. The district court erred in failing to grant Appellant's Motion To
Strike the Crawley Affidavit and the offending portions of the
Reply Memorandum of Appellee which were wholly irrelevant
and were filed to malign, and to intimidate Appellant and his
family, and filed with actual malice as stated; and the District
Court erred in failing to award to Appellant Rule 11 Sanctions
for filing the irrelevant and malicious Crawley Affidavit, and for
using an unlicensed private investigator, in violation of Utah
law, to obtain the affidavit; and for failing to alert the court of
the fact and failing and refusing to take any steps to rectify
said problems once notice was provided.
(1) Motion To Strike
Responding to Orvis' Motion For Summary Judgment, Appellant Johnson
filed his opposing memorandum and affidavit, raising therein material issues of
fact and law. In his Reply, Appellee Orvis submitted the Crawley Affidavit. It was
wholly irrelevant. It was the sort of personal attack, not responding to any issue
of law, that would seem to be typically abhorred by the legal profession and
courts alike. It would turn out that Appellee and his counsel Tomsic engaged an
unlicensed private investigator to collect this information [Record p. 958] and
converse with minor children, [Record p. 588] in violation of Utah law. Appellant
properly and justly moved to strike this Reply and Crawley affidavit citing three
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basis in support. The affidavit was unresponsive to the prior pleading as required
of a reply memorandum. (Appellant cited Record p. 586). It was also
inappropriate under Rules 56(e) and 12(f) as scandalous, and immaterial. And it
was so clearly irrelevant that it was not justified under any basis.
Then Orvis and his counsel Tomsic, in his opposition memorandum to the
motion to strike, actually admitted that the Crawley affidavit was submitted for a
malicious and irrelevant purpose. Appellee and counsel stated: "While the facts
ascertained by Mr. Crawley will be critical to any attempt by Mr. Orvis to collect on
his judgment, they serve here to belie any notion forwarded by Mr. Johnson that
he is an innocent party." [Record p. 593] They further state: "[Johnsons] have
lived a very comfortable lifestyle for years that has been directly funded by Mr.
Johnson's fraud and deceit and to the detriment of Mr. Johnson's many
creditors." [Record p. 593]
Given the clear irrelevant and admittedly malicious nature of the Crawley
affidavit, the District Court erred in not granting Appellant's Motion To Strike.
(2) Rule 11 Sanctions
Appellant sought Rule 11 Sanctions against Appellee and his counsel for
three reasons: Appellee Orvis submitted the irrelevant and malicious Crawley
Affidavit for an improper purpose, and maligned Appellant in both the Crawley
Affidavit and in the Reply to the Motion To Strike; Appellee Orvis and counsel
engaged an unlicensed private investigator to perform a surveillance of
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Appellant's home, allowing him to extract evidence from the minor children of
Appellant [Record p. 588] to collect information for and submit the malicious
Crawley Affidavit; and after notice of the illegality and a request for assistance in
rectifying this problem, [Record p. 1017] Appellee and counsel willfully refused to
rectify this situation, refused to withdraw the offending pleadings, and continued
to rely on the testimony of the illegal unlicensed investigator and even argued
before the Court with the offending pleadings in place without informing the Court
of the status of the information.
It appears that the offending material was submitted to intimidate, harass,
inflame and malign, and in fact, it did offend and intimidate not only Appellant but
Appellant's wife, DaNell Johnson who submitted an affidavit. [Record p. 878] It
was oppressive and intended to be so.
Note also that Orvis and counsel Tomsic have engaged in a pattern of bad
and sanctionable acts in related cases and Appellant set these out in the moving
pleadings. These allegations were not denied by Appellee Orvis or Counsel
Tomsic. This is relevant because Rule 11 considers what measure of sanctions
are necessary to stop such sanctionable acts. Because Appellant is pro se and
has little funds to engage counsel, Orvis and his counsel Tomsic have
aggressively stretched and crossed the bounds of acceptable contact in this and
other cases—seemingly with impunity.
The trial Court erred in not granting Rule 11 sanctions against Appellee
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and Appellee's counsel. This court is respectfully requested to impose Rule 11
sanctions and to remand to the district court to find the amount of monetary
sanctions to impose.

E. The District Court erred in awarding Appellee Orvis monetary
sanctions when granting the protective order.

The district court granted monetary sanctions against Appellant for
providing too short a notice for depositions of three persons: Paul Schwenke,
Mark Cummings, and Bruce Giffen. The depositions of all three of these persons
were noticed up already by Orvis in two other cases, for the same date that notice
was provided in the district courts case. More than ten days notice had in
actuality been provided, by virtue of the notice in the other cases. Appellant
Johnson had reason to fear the loss of testimony by the imminent departure of
Victor Lawrence and by the criminal trial (later continued) of Paul Schwenke.
The district court erred in imposing monetary sanctions for these notices
because Appellant had valid basis to fear the loss of testimony and the actual
dates given were already given in other courts, and Appellant provided, at the
hearing on this matter, adequate support for his actions to the district court of the
basis for the deposition notices in this court. [Record, p. 1113 Transcript p. 6]
It should be noted that the district court granted sanctions against Appellant
with virtually a one line request in the Orvis motion for protective order and no
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oral argument therefor, but the same court refused sanctions against Orvis and
counsel despite an admission to violating the law and a refusal after request and
notice to rectify that violation. The sanctions cause a significant financial burden
on Appellant. The imposition of monetary sanctions should be reversed.

XI. CONCLUSION
While one may purchase a judgment against another and enforce it, there
are constraints and legitimate defenses that may be asserted. The judgment
purchaser who seeks strict and sometimes onerous enforcement lives by the
sword but must be prepared to die by it, as well.
It should be starkly obvious that all the machinations by Orvis and his
counsel are for a purpose of defending against and concealing fraud,
embezzlement and betrayal.
The district court below, in very few hearings, granted summary judgment
against Appellant on only one issue, ignoring the entirety of genuine and
exceptionally well documented material issues of fact; the district court granted
sanctions against Appellant for noticing up depositions; the district court denied
Appellant's motion to strike and Motion for Rule 11 sanctions, for Orvis' agent, an
unlicensed private detective, to surveil the minor children of Appellant, and, with
impunity, to violate criminal law, and to file, with clear malice, pleadings that are
irrelevant yet harmful.
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Appellant is pro se. Orvis has consistently argued (and will likely again
argue in his reply to this brief) that Appellant is a disgraced person not worthy to
withstand the lower court's summary dismissal. Orvis attacks Appellant
personally, but has not dealt directly with the facts and law set out below and
here. Orvis cannot deny that Victor Lawrence represented each of the Johnsons,
and him, and the partnership. Orvis cannot deny that his own employee has
testified that Orvis and attorney Lawrence conspired to buy judgments against the
Johnsons. Orvis cannot deny that he was allocating profit share with the
Johnsons and ceased it immediately upon acquiring the judgments here. Orvis
cannot deny the breach of partnership fiduciary duty and, indeed, of attorney
fiduciary duty. Orvis cannot deny that his own employee testified that he set up
secret companies to receive and siphon money from the Orvis-Johnson
partnership, and that he deliberately misstated partnership accounting.
Indeed, if the allegations documented in the court below and in this brief,
regarding the actions of Orvis and attorney Lawrence are true, these claims also
constitute a crime. Yet all this is seemingly ignored below. Appellant has more
than once asked "Where is fairness?". Is it possible to obtain based solely on the
law or does expensive legal support overwhelm a fair adjudication?
Appellant seeks for the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court's grant
of summary judgment and send the case back down so the issues of material fact
may go to a trier of fact.
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For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respectfully asks the honorable
Court of Appeals for the following relief:
1. That the summary judgment be reversed and this case remanded to the
district court for the reasons argued;
2. That the material issues of fact raised herein be found to have sufficient
merit and materiality to be addressed by the trier of fact below;
3. That the denial of the motion to strike be reversed and the offending
pleadings be struck;
4. That the Rule 11 sanctions be imposed or that the district court be
required to review the matter again based on the illegality of the private detective
and the maliciousness of the pleadings; and
5. That the award of attorney's fees in connection with the protective order
be rescinded.
Appellant expresses his gratitude to this Court of Appeals for its
consideration of this Brief of Appellant.

DATED this I > T

day of May, 2005
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